Statements, Discontinuities, and Representation: Answering Contentions Against Postmodernism by Bose, Dev Kumar
 
 
Statements, Discontinuities, and Representation:  Answering 
Contentions Against Postmodernism 
 
“A glance at Howe's nine-point list of the ‘traits or symptoms’ of postmodern 
culture reveals that, for Howe, the debasement of modernist ‘symbolic 
economies’ has as its precise correlate a ‘postmodernist sense of hopelessness, 
passivity, and indeed impotence.’  The postmodernist problem, you will 
remember, is how to represent malaise. Just to the extent that “traditional 
ceremonies” are “debased into mere occasions for public display,” it seems, 
“passivity becomes a widespread social attitude.”1 (emphasis mine) 
 
Using the critical lens of Irving Howe, Herman explains that the difference between 
modernism and postmodernism is that the former attempts to explain the unexplainable 
nature of life’s abstractions, while the latter abandons this search because the search for 
any type of origin is fruitless—that is, there is no basis for originality because of the 
constructed nature of truth. Herman contends that this is a paltry excuse for 
postmodernism to passively explain the world’s problems off as mere spectacles. For 
Herman, the dilemma with postmodernism is that it seems to explain problems of 




Herman’s argument is an example of how postmodernism is often talked about in a 
narrow sense.  This paper answers the argument based on the perspectives of four 
thinkers—Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, but most notably Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Bernard Stiegler.  The charges against postmodernism I have chosen to emphasize are 
malaise, impotence, and passivity, since these are focal points of the preceding thinkers.  
In contending these criticisms, this paper demonstrates the usefulness of the postmodern 
approach in analyzing statements and discontinuities.  
 
1. Foucault 
In “Truth and Power,” Foucault says, “It is a question of what governs statements, and 
the way in which they govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which 
are scientifically acceptable, and hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific 
procedure.”2  For Foucault, “It’s ... a matter of knowing ... what effects of power circulate 
among scientific statements.”3  Foucault contends that what is lacking for statements is 
the effect that power has upon them.  Statements, then, are propositions that have gone 
through rigorous social testing and become known as discourse.  Cultures are formed by 
statements, which are the basic unit of discourse. Here, Foucault helps us to understand 
what statements are and their relationship to discourse, and, as we shall see, their place in 
the broader sense of postmodernism. 
 
The basis for contention is that an emphasis on abstraction contributes to malaise; 
however, Foucault’s approach to categorizing the world through statements should 
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instead be viewed as a heuristic to philosophical understanding. He says, “These rules 
define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the 
ordering of objects.”4  Foucault resists global interpretations by replacing grand 
narratives with individual perspectives. This is important to realizing that discontinuities 
reflect branches of thought, which we can now properly understand as being social 
sciences.  Foucault resists the idea that history can be told as a singular narrative of 
events, arguing for its manifestation as an unstable entanglement of sub-narratives 




Deleuze’s theories also contribute to the misconception of postmodern malaise.  In 
Foucault, he says, “No sense of possibility or potentiality exists in the realm of 
statements. Everything in them is real and all reality is manifestly present. All that counts 
is what has been formulated at a given moment, including any blanks and gaps.”5  
Statements mythologize in that they force us to align an analytical interpretation based on 
what they prescribe; while this does not negatively reflect their value, it does indicate that 
statements should be read as stand-alone notations.  Deleuze warns us not to read beyond 
the lines to the extent that the meaning of the statement becomes clouded. 
 
In a similarly cautious fashion, Deleuze points out the dangers of reading statements too 
broadly. He says, “Behind the curtain there is nothing to see, but it was all the more 
important each time to describe the curtain, or the base, since there was nothing either 
behind or beneath it.”6  Here, Deleuze defends Foucault’s belief that statements should be 
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viewed contextually.  Ignoring the rhetoric of the statement in favor of a nonexistent 
larger picture, some universal Platonic ideal, is to deny the importance of the statement as 
a stand-alone proclamation.  For Deleuze, statements are present in every text, and it is 
crucial that we take every text presented to us with care and consideration.    
If statements are to be read on their own, what about the problem of multiple audiences?  
With this we shall move on to the issue of representation as discussed by Nancy. 
 
3. Nancy 
In addition to malaise, impotence is a concept brought about by Herman that infects 
postmodernism.  In The Ground of the Image, Nancy argues that impotence is the result 
of a social obsession with violence.  In the age of postmodernism, when large-scale 
tragedies against the human condition such as the atomic bomb, genocide, and terrorism 
have caused us to vitally re-think our ontologies (rather than ignore them, as Herman 
would suggest), modernist ideas such as the search for end-all explanations have been 
replaced with fragility and a turning over of the self. It should come as no surprise, then, 
that Nancy refers to the Shoah as the “ultimate crisis of representation.”7 
 
But what is representation according to Nancy’s analysis?  Extending the Baudrillardian 
interpretation, he says, “Representation is not a simulacrum; it is not the replacement of 
the original thing—in fact, it has nothing to do with a thing.”8  If the fundamental 
difference has to do with the presence of origin, Nancy notes that the Shoah has nothing 
to do with any conceivable origin; thus, “It is the presentation of what does not amount to 
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a presence, given and completed ... or it is the bringing to presence of an intelligible 
reality (or form) by the formal mediation of a sensory reality.”9  Representation involves 
a clash of what is real by what is perceived to be real—and since the tragedy of the Shoah 
is way beyond what the world could perceive of as being horrible before its occurrence, it 
changes the way that global tragedy is understood and portrayed.  I argue here that 
tragedy becomes imaginary – imagery – imaged. 
 
Nancy argues that the image becomes grounded as a result of what he refers to as the 
distinct.  Stipulating the power of the image lies in its representational nature, “The image 
is always sacred ... Religion in itself is not ordered by the sacred ... The sacred is what it 
is only through its separation, and there is no bond with it. There is then, strictly 
speaking, no religion of the sacred ... [The distinct] is what cannot touch.”10  Nancy 
converges the traditional meanings of sacredness and distinctness here, shifting their 
combined focus to distancing. That is, the image, in its sacredness, implies both a literal 
and figurative distance between the subject and observer.  Furthermore, since the image 
cannot be touched, Nancy argues that religion is incapable of studying the sacred:  this is 
due to the impossibility of worshipping that which is disassociated. 
 
It is in this disassociation that we see the source of what mistakenly would be considered 
postmodern impotence:  “[The distinction of the image] does not legitimize [nor] 
transgress; it crosses the distance of the withdrawal even while maintaining it through its 
mark as an image ... The essence of such a crossing lies in its not establishing a 
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continuity:  it does not suppress the distinction”11 (emphasis mine).  Owing to the 
disconnect between subject and object, it would appear that the distinction does nothing 
more than facilitate violence.  While Herman may be correct to argue that violence 
results as a result of passivity, I venture to go a step further by arguing that the distinction 
is always there awaiting answers that will be studied through several conflicting lenses.  
 
Nancy takes this argument in an interesting turn in “The Two Secrets of the Fetish,” in 
which he argues that power takes place in the form of a secret.  Nancy:  “The fetish 
becomes a double secret: the secret that critical analysis reveals as the poor monetary 
secret, and the secret that subsists in the intensity of a presence in so much as, as a 
presence, it precisely keeps its secret, and in so much as its presence is in this keeping.”12  
The Shoah is a secret that has no saving grace for its victims; the Nazis’ motivation is to 
have a pure race (or in Nancy’s terms, image), which becomes the driving motivation 
behind the genocide (that is, grounding).  Furthermore, the secret inevitably exists to 
torture its victims.  In a Deleuzian twist, Nancy contends that the secret behind the crisis 
of representation is an inability to connect between image and observer.     
 
The grounding of the image is a crucial foundation to Nancy’s thinking. He says, “The 
image does not stand before the ground like a net or a screen. We do not sink; rather, the 
ground rises to us in the image. The double separation of the image, its pulling away and 
its cutting out, form both a protection against the ground and an opening onto it.”13  The 
image, in other words, is an active producer of meanings, despite the fact that it carries 
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nothing substantial in and of itself. It produces meanings by feeding off the observer, who 
breathes life into it through ideological consumption. Nancy notes the concept of “double 
separation” as one that simultaneously distances itself and makes a mark upon its 
observer. This effect is responsible for the productive nature of the image. 
 
Nancy’s argument goes further than a simplistic perspective on impotence.  By recalling 
the psychological distancing occurring between abuser and victim, we see that the power 
of the image has a tendency towards abuse:  “The violent person wants to see the mark on 
the thing or being he assaults, and violence consists precisely in imprinting such a mark. 
It is in the enjoyment (jouissance) of this mark that the ‘excess’ defining violence comes 
into play.”14  By pointing out the sadistic pleasure a forced ideology, Nancy emphasizes 
analyzing master narratives in terms of those who are being abused.  Recalling Foucault, 
impotence is not the end result of postmodernism but a call for action.  
 
On this note, Nancy argues that the Shoah manifests “a complete devastation of 
representation or even of the possibility of representing, to such an extent that there is not 
even any way to represent this devastation or to put representation to its own test—to the 
test, that is, of making what is not of the order of presence come to presence.”15  Since 
the tragedy reflects a crisis of representation, what this means in terms of images is that it 
invites observers to study the Shoah, all the while considering that it can never be 
subjected to a holistic understanding. The Shoah, then, becomes likened to a postmodern 
image:  that is, one that lacks an origin yet necessitates analysis.  This also contends 
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Herman’s argument against postmodernism as being apathetic to human tragedy, since 
analysis of such events requires a dedicated understanding to pain.  As Nancy indicates, 
“Every image is in some way a ‘portrait,’ not in that it would reproduce the traits of a 
person, but in that it pulls and draws ... in that it extracts something, an intimacy, a 
force.”16  Steigler examines this perspective in great detail from the vantage point of 
technology in Technics and Time 1:  The Fault of Epimethus, which answers the violence 
behind technology discussed by Nancy. 
 
4. Stiegler 
By showing that crises of representation occur in conjunction with secrets, I have argued 
that impotence does not fit within the postmodern focus.  It is now time to turn to the last 
of Herman’s contentions, passivity.  Steigler makes the following conclusions regarding 
technology:  1) technology is systematic and 2) technology is the result of consumerist 
evolution. In concluding these ideas, I argue that passivity does not belong to postmodern 
thought because postmodernism necessitates a call for action. 
 
Recalling Foucault’s notion of the social sciences invoking discontinuity, Stiegler says, 
“A technical system constitutes a temporal unity. It is a stabilization of technical 
evolution around a point of equilibrium concretized by a particular technology ... The 
evolution of technical systems moves towards the complexity and progressive solidarity 
of the combined elements.”17  The core of Steigler’s argument is that humans use 
technology to relocate themselves within the world as short-term purveyors of progress. 
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In other words, we seek to stabilize our surroundings through the temporary fix of 
technology. Just as history strives to tell an objective tale where there is none, Steigler 
claims technology is a stabilizing force in the midst of constant abstraction.  Comparing 
this perspective to Foucault’s structuralist viewpoint of history, I argue that both 
technology and history seek to narrate organized accounts of man’s story. 
 
Steigler’s argument finds support in Heidegger’s notion of presencing.  In The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, Heidegger explains that presencing is “that 
which arises and opens itself, which, as what presences, comes upon man as the one who 
presences.”18  Cautioning that the closer anyone thinks they are to understanding nature, 
Heidegger argues that they distance themselves from nature even more; this runs parallel 
to Stiegler’s unsaid implication that, in his temporal technological pursuit, man denies 
himself the need to dwell/question his surroundings.  Through his use of the 
Heideggerian approach, we arrive at the first of Steigler’s conclusions:  technology 
should be treated as a system rather than an after-effect, or product.  Therefore we can 
say that technology is responsible for shaping the human condition.  
 
At this point the refutation of postmodern passivity comes into the picture—why should 
we let ourselves be controlled by technology?  Here Heidegger’s concept of ereignis is 
important.  In an argument parallel to Foucault’s statement, “Every event must be seen so 
as to be fitted into this ground plan of nature.  Only within the perspective of this ground 
plan does an event in nature become visible as such an event.”19  More than simply an 
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event, ereignis refers to a vital issue of great consequence—one that must be addressed.  
Accordingly, “it is necessary to consider Heidegger's ‘step back’ into the essence of 
metaphysics.  Systematically viewed, this ‘step back’ is that transcendence that leads to 
the ‘essential origin of identity’ to which both Being and thinking belong and that 
Heidegger calls ereignis” (Hoping).20      
 
Disenchanted by the traditional approach to problem solving, Heidegger’s stress on the 
“essential origin of identity” mandates a call for action.  Rather than apathetically 
viewing the problems of the world, as Herman would suggest, the postmodern concept 
ereignis forces us to become objective problem solvers.  Through distancing, as we have 
already seen with Nancy, the distinct withdrawal between subject and observer creates a 
perspectival gap.  This is relevant to Steigler’s argument that technology systematically 
shapes the human condition—we are not controlled by technology:  technology positions 
our perspectives, and it is vital that we re-territorialize ourselves within it.  
 
Here we come to the second of Steigler’s conclusions.  He says, “The development of 
consumerism, accompanying constant innovation, aims at a greater flexibility in 
consumer attitudes, which adapt and must adapt ever more quickly, at a pace obviously 
not without effect on the specifically cultural sphere.”21  While Steigler emphasizes the 
cultural impact of updates on state-of-the-art technology, he makes a crucial point here in 
terms of flexibility:  consumerism is the result of technology keeping up with the 
constantly evolving nature of individuals.  Steigler deconstructs the deterministic attitude 
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“cultures become shaped as a result of technology,” instead saying technology is the 
result of consumerist evolution.  
 
Looking past the dynamics of human change is an important aspect of Stiegler’s 
argument, as well as a far cry from any notion of postmodern passivity. He says, “This is 
what must be affirmed in the first place:  that there is a full, pure origin, followed then by 
alteration, corruption, impurity, the fall. The nature of man is not in the way he changes. 
There is, there has to be, a nature of man before change.”22  Stiegler makes the optimistic 
claim that there is a human origin that can be understood.  Moreover, understanding our 
roots allows us to determine our future.  While technology allows us to cross the distance 
between ourselves and our origin, it is important that we never forget where we come 
from.  
 
Throughout this paper I have refuted some of the criticisms against postmodern thought.  
In doing so, I have emphasized the power of statements to represent the abstract human 
condition—an abstractness that begs categorization by thinkers like Herman.  Through a 
discussion constituting the statement (Foucault), ideology (Deleuze), the distinct (Nancy), 
and technology (Steigler), I have tried to show how the process of producing statements 
is voluble—thus, categorization can often be deeply rooted in personal ideologies and 
interpretations.  If action is not raised as part of the postmodern calling, I will not refute 
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